between actions and discourses that are meant to be taken "seriously" and others whose status is different: they are recognized as "playful pretense" or as "makebelieve." Furthermore, developmental psychology and comparative ethnology have shown that the distinction between representations having truth claims and 'makebelieve' representations is crucial in the ontogenetic development of the cognitive structure of the infant psyche and that this phenomenon is transcultural (see Goldman & Emmison 1995; Goldman 1998) . Finally, as far as myth is concerned, it is clearly considered a type of factual discourse: people adhere to it as serious discourse referring to something real (this is also the case of the Bible; see Sternberg 1985 Sternberg , 1990 . As shown by Veyne ([1983 Veyne ([ ] 1988 , the social construction of "truthful discourse" posits an array of "truth programs" linked to various ontological domains (e.g. the profane as distinct from the sacred). Thus "myth" can be "true" (i.e Genette ([1972 Genette ([ ] 1980 Genette ([ , [1983 Genette ([ ] 1988 and Stanzel (1964 Stanzel ( , [1979 Stanzel ( ] 1984 , for example, were general narratologies whose sole input was fictional texts. It was only at a later stage that narratologists explicitly investigated the relationship between narrative techniques and the fictionality/factuality distinction (Genette [1991 (Genette [ ] 1993 Cohn 1999 ).
. treated as serious and referring to some reality), even if believing in its truth enters into conflict with what in another ontological domain is accepted as truthful. For example, in myth and its corresponding reality, people can be endowed with powers nobody would imagine them having in everyday life. This does not imply that there is no distinction between fact and fiction, but that what counts as a fact may be relative to a specific "truth program." The poststructuralist criticism of the fact/fiction dichotomy has pointed out that every (narrative) representation is a human construction, and more precisely that it is a model projected onto reality. But the fact that discourse in general, and narrative discourse in particular, are constructions does not by itself disqualify ontological realism or the distinction between fact and fiction. To rule out ontological realism, it would be necessary to show independently that the constructive nature of discourse in general or of narrative in particular makes them fictional or at least implies a "fictionalizing" dynamics. This proof has never been delivered, and so the common-sense hypothesis remains the default option.

The relationship between narratology (Meister → Narratology [1]) and theory of fiction long remained non-existent, in part because classical narratology rarely addressed the question of the fact/fiction difference. The theory was intended to be valid for all narratives, although in reality the classical narratologists drew only on fictional texts. The classical models by
Fact and Fiction, Narrative and Non-narrative
It is important, therefore, that Plato's Republic (1974: chap. III and X) and a little later in Aristotle's Poetics, develop 
two quite divergent conceptions which have structured Western attitudes toward fiction up to this day. Plato's theory of representation is founded on a strong opposition between imitation of ideas and imitation of appearances (the empirical world): representation of events as such, contrary to rational argument, is an imitation of appearances, which means that it is cut off from truth. He further posits a strong opposition between mimesis and diegesis. Speaking about stories and myths, he distinguishes between: (a) a pure story (haple diegesis), in which the poet speaks in his own name (as in dithyrambs)
Mimesis and the Fact/Fiction Distinction without pretending to be someone else; (b) a story by mimesis (imitation), in which the poet speaks through his characters (as in tragedy and comedy), meaning that he pretends to be someone else; (c) a mixed form combining the two previous forms (as in epic poetry, where pure narration is mixed with characters' discourse). Plato's preference goes to pure narration, for he disapproves of representation by mimesis (in Book X of The Republic, he goes so far as to exclude mimetic artists from the "ideal city"). Mimesis is a simulacrum, an "as if," and as such it is opposed to truth:
mimesis can never be more than a "make-believe" (for the concept of "makebelieve," see Walton 1990 ). The Aristotelian conception must be distinguished from "possible worlds" theories of fiction (Pavel 1986; Ryan 1991; Ronen 1994; Doležel 1998 Doležel , 1999 , inspired by the possible worlds logics of Kripke (1963 Kripke ( , 1980 or Lewis (1973 Lewis ( , 1978 Doležel 1999 ) are by necessity "segregationist" (Pavel 1986: 11-7 (e.g. Ryan 1991; Ronen 1994 Searle [1975 Searle [ ] 1979 Hamburger ([1957 Hamburger ([ ] 1973 and Banfield (1982) (Banfield 1982 (Banfield , 2002 Ryan 2001: 89-171) . The symptoms of fictionality (see Schmid 2010: 21-33 (perceptual, etc.) perspective (Schaeffer 1998: 148-66; 
The concept of mimesis developed by Aristotle in his
. Both theories define fictional narrative by syntactic traits which, in theory, are excluded from factual narrative. Hamburger famously stated that the domain of what is usually regarded as fiction divides into two radically disjoined fields: "pretense," which is a simulation of real utterances and defines the status of first-person non-factual narrative; and "fiction proper," which is a simulation of imaginary universes indexed to perspectively organized mental states and which defines non-factual third-person narrative. In other words, according to Hamburger, in the narrative realm only thirdperson narrative is fictional, non-factual first-person narrative belonging to another logical field, that of pretended utterances. Hamburger, at least in the first edition of her book ([1957] 1973), contends that, contrary to pretense, fiction is narratorless, a view sharply opposed to mainstream narratology according to which the narrator
Syntactic Definitions (not necessarily personified) is a structural element of any narration, be it factual or fictional, first-person or third-person. Banfield, although her theory is formulated in a much more technical way (based on Chomskyan generative grammar), defends a position similar to that of the German critic. She develops a "grammatical definition"
of the genre "novel," which in fact is a definition of internally focalized heterodiegetic fiction. Among the anomalies defining the novel understood this way, Banfield puts particular emphasis on the specific use of deictics and free indirect discourse. According to her theory, the specific grammar of the novel consists in a double phenomenon: elimination of the first person except in inner direct speech coinciding with the construction of a special third-person pronoun (called "the E-level shifter" by Banfield). This special shifter suspends the "one text / one speaker" rule that governs discourse outside of fiction and which is grounded in the principle that deictics shift referents with each new E (each new speaker). In a novel, a new point of view need not correspond to a new referent of the first person and hence to a new text. This situation is of course impossible in real-life communication, where each point of view is tied to a specific person. Therefore, fictional sentences are "unspeakable." In fact, Banfield's "E-level shifter" is functionally equivalent to Hamburger's floating "narrative function" which can move freely between different "I-origins." Hamburger and Banfield have clearly identified linguistic processes which are typical of internally focalized heterodiegetic fiction (Niederhoff → Focalization [3]) and which cannot be easily accounted for in terms of pretense in third-person factual narrative. This is especially true of free indirect discourse and grammatical anomalies of spatial and temporal deictics. All of these phenomena are tied to what Banfield aptly calls a "special" third-person pronoun which is able to shift freely between different Egos. They invite an analysis of fictional narrative in terms of direct simulation of imaginary universes presented perspectively and (on the side of the reader) in terms of immersion (see
. On the side of the writer, these deviating practices are in fact the grammatical third-person transcription of the imaginative simulation of "fictive I-origins" (Jannidis → Character [4]). On the side of the reader, they activate an immersive dynamics: the reader "slips into" the characters, experiencing the fictional world as it is seen perspectively by the characters from within or sometimes, as Banfield suggests, from a point of view that remains "empty" (in terms of a specific "I").
Contra Hamburger and Banfield, however, it is no less true that the majority of heterodiegetic fictions also contain elements that are best described as simulations of factual narrative statements (Schaeffer [1999 (Schaeffer [ ] 2010 (Hamburger) [1975] 1979: 58-75 
or to distinguish between a grammar of epic narration and a grammar of the novel (Banfield). More generally, it would be necessary to accept the counterintuitive conclusion that most fictional texts fall short of the definition of fiction. If semantic definitions of fiction are generally too weak (they fail to distinguish between a fiction and a lie), syntactic definitions are generally too strong (many texts must be excluded which common sense considers to be fictional).
The pragmatic definition of fiction is generally linked to the name of Searle, who is certainly its most important proponent, even though the idea of defining fiction pragmatically is much older than Searle. A pragmatic theory of narrative fiction was implicitly defended by Hume. It could be argued, more generally, that wherever and whenever public representations function as fictions, people link them to their pragmatic specificity because it is only by treating representations in this particular way that they become fictional representations (instead of false statements or lies). Even so, Searle's definition of verbal fiction in terms of pretended speech acts (
The Pragmatic Status of Narrative Fiction: Imagination and Playful Pretense
Walton, whose contribution to a pragmatics of fiction is as important as Searle's, objected Koselleck (1979) , the intention to create a factual or a fictional text has to be communicated by signals to be effective. These signals are often paratextual, but for the competent reader there also exist many textual "signposts" (Cohn 1990 ) signaling fictionality or factuality (see Iser 1983: 121-52 (Cohn 1990 Crittenden 1991 : 45-52; Zipfel 2001: 185-95 (Dokic & Proust 2002: intro., vii 
Topics for Further Investigation
